Steven D. Silverstein, Esq.

Every attorney guilty of any deceit or collusion with intent to deceive the court or any party is guilty of a misdemeanor. The conduct frame is the continued presentation of client representations to the tribunal following documented receipt of contradicting evidence through Notice Pattern N-01 through N-06. §6128 also supplies a civil treble-damages remedy independent of the criminal misdemeanor exposure.

Procuring another person to commit perjury. The conduct frame is calling and examining the client witness at trial after documented notice that the contemplated testimony was contradicted by preserved record evidence: the sealed cashier’s check, the USPS tracking confirmation, the landlord’s own “Hanson has the check” text message, and the bank records of the second payment made under written protest.

Offering in evidence as genuine any written instrument knowing the same to have been fraudulently made. The instruments at issue include the Move-Out Clearance Report (DocuSign Envelope F5D247C2) and derivative exhibits containing eleven documented facial defects, offered into evidence following receipt of the Notice Pattern identifying those defects.

Preparing any false or antedated paper or document with intent to produce it as genuine in any trial or proceeding. The conduct frame is coordination with the property-management chain in assembly of trial exhibits where the underlying instruments contain the documentary defects identified in the companion charging document.

Persons who aid and abet the commission of a crime are principals. The underlying offenses are alleged client perjury (PC §118) and client filing of false documents (PC §115). Knowledge element satisfied via Notice Pattern plus Global-Tech analysis.

Two or more persons conspiring to commit enumerated offenses plus an overt act in furtherance. Each in-court use of the trial exhibits is an overt act. The document-flow chain connects the property owner, property manager, contractor, and attorney of record.

Use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. Each post-notice transmission of trial exhibits, declarations, or filings — DocuSign envelopes, email transmissions, electronic court filings — is a separately countable wire after the date of documented notice.

Use of U.S. Mail in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. Each USPS-mailed pleading, exhibit, or notice transmitted by counsel’s office following the documented Notice Pattern is a separately countable mailing.

Duty of attorney to employ such means only as are consistent with truth and never to seek to mislead the judge by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. The conduct frame includes in-court representations during trial proceedings including characterizations regarding the disposition of the cashier’s check, the status of tenant payments, and the authenticity of the move-out packet.

The binary implication: either Silverstein consulted the client about the Notice Pattern — in which case he proceeded to trial with actual knowledge of the client’s response to the allegations — or he failed to consult, which is a Rule 1.4 violation. No third scenario exists.

An attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact to a tribunal and shall not offer evidence the attorney knows to be false. “Knows” in RPC 1.0.1(f) includes actual knowledge and permits knowledge to be inferred from circumstances. The Notice Pattern plus preserved evidence supply the circumstances from which knowledge of falsity may be inferred.

An attorney shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or reckless or intentional misrepresentation. Receipt of specific, documented, repeated notice through six independent channels that client representations were contradicted by preserved evidence, followed by continuation without independent verification or disclosure to the tribunal, satisfies the reckless-misrepresentation standard.

By presenting a pleading or other paper to the court, an attorney certifies that the factual contentions therein have evidentiary support. The three-day notice served June 21, 2024 was unsigned (typed name only), demanded payment to a Wells Fargo account number different from the one specified in the executed lease, and was served only on Michael Gasio while two additional tenants named on the lease were not served. CCP §1162 requires service on all occupants. The facial defects of the notice were knowable from the face of the documents available to eviction counsel before filing.

The Three-Day Notice was taped to the front door on Friday evening, June 21, 2024. The next day, Saturday June 22, 2024, the landlord (Tran) sent the plaintiff a text message admitting in writing that he did not know rent had been paid to the broker’s account, was confused by the contract, and had caused the Notice to be sent based on the broker’s false report that no payment had been received. The text was received during the statutory cure window. Twelve days later, on July 3, 2024, eviction counsel filed an unlawful detainer complaint on behalf of the same client whose own writing, dated the day after Notice service, conceded the predicate of the nonpayment claim. The complaint did not disclose the June 22 admission to the Court. Either counsel knew of the admission and proceeded anyway (Rule 3.3 / 8.4(c) violation), or counsel failed to inquire of his client about the basis for the Notice (Rule 3.1 / Rule 1.4 violation). On either election, the prosecution of the unlawful detainer was without reasonable factual basis as of July 3, 2024.

Following the March 27, 2025 Under Submission Ruling, Silverstein transmitted to the plaintiff, by United States certified mail, a document titled “(PROPOSED) AMENDED JUDGMENT.” Drafted on Silverstein’s law-office letterhead. Captioned in the Superior Court for the State of California, County of Orange, Central Justice Center. Recites the case number, names assigned commissioner Carmen D. Snuggs-Spraggins, recites the trial submission date of February 25, 2025. Sets forth findings: judgment $4,325 + attorney’s fees $500 + court costs $500 = $5,325. The signature line for the judge is blank. The date line is blank. The document was never signed by any judge of the Superior Court of California. The transmission was for collection purposes. The plaintiff paid the demanded sum on April 22, 2025. 15 U.S.C. §1692e(9) prohibits the use or distribution of any written communication that simulates or is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court. The Heintz v. Jenkins doctrine (514 U.S. 291 (1995)) confirms FDCPA application to attorneys collecting on consumer debts. Cal. PC §115 reaches the offering of a false instrument; felony exposure. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §6128(a) reaches attorney deceit toward a party with civil treble damages.

In response to the certified-mail transmission of the unsigned (PROPOSED) AMENDED JUDGMENT, the plaintiff issued Wells Fargo cashier’s check #0084412016 on April 22, 2025 in the amount of $5,338.48 (demanded sum plus statutory interest). The plaintiff named on the face of the instrument both PHAT K. TRAN and STEVEN D. SILVERSTEIN as joint payees. Memo: “DUPLICATE JUL 24 RENT/PAID UNDER PROTEST.” UPS Express tracking #1Z6017R6803685099A1. The placement of opposing counsel on the face of a tenant-to-landlord court-related payment instrument places counsel in personal contact with the funds and creates a documentary record of his handling of the disputed sum. Whatever subsequently became of that instrument — endorsed and deposited, declined and returned, retained but not negotiated — is preserved in Wells Fargo’s processing record and reachable by subpoena. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 1.15 governs the safekeeping of funds in which others claim an interest.

Approximately three years before the present matter, Silverstein, on behalf of the same client (Phat L.K. Tran), prosecuted an unlawful detainer that resulted in the eviction of the prior tenant of 19235 Brynn Court. The prior tenant’s rent at the time of her eviction was approximately $3,600 per month. The Gasios moved in 30 days later (May 1, 2022) at $5,000 per month. Two years and two months later, Silverstein, on behalf of the same client, prosecuted the unlawful detainer that resulted in the Gasios’ eviction. The property was then converted to short-term Airbnb operation at $7,786 per month base rate. The pattern of practice — two unlawful detainers, twenty-six months apart, on behalf of the same client, at the same single-family residence, each followed by a substantial rent increase to the next occupant — is documented from the address record alone. Whether the pattern reflects deliberate coordination is a question for prosecutorial and regulatory review.

The Move Out Clearance Report executed August 5, 2024 by Anna Ly (DocuSign Envelope F5D247C2-A1A9-4991-B91F-6A333347A87D, examined in detail at /silverstein-form.html) contains a pre-printed line for “Attorney Fees” on which $2,005 was deducted from the security deposit. The deduction was made before any court adjudication of attorney fees. Cal. Civ. Code §1950.5(b) does not include attorney fees among permitted security-deposit deductions. The deduction is unlawful on the face of the form. A 47-year California eviction-practice veteran, who teaches eviction-practice continuing legal education and serves as pro tem judge in Orange County courts, would recognize an unauthorized attorney-fee deduction on a residential security-deposit accounting form on first reading. The questions of fact: was the $2,005 deduction taken on Silverstein’s instruction, with his knowledge, or based on his invoice? Was the same form used in the prior 19235 Brynn Court eviction with the same pre-printed line? Was the same form used in matters Silverstein has prosecuted for related clients (e.g., on behalf of Thao Tran)? Each separate use establishes a pattern under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 and bears on the §6128 deceit framing.

On the first scheduled trial date, in the courthouse hallway prior to the matter being called, Silverstein presented the move-out invoice and stated, in substance, that the parties needed to negotiate. He then conveyed, in substance, that payment of the bill in full would result in his not proceeding with an eviction filing. The statement was made before the bench took the matter, by counsel of record to a pro se litigant, and conditioned the eviction filing on payment of the move-out invoice. The move-out invoice line items had been on Silverstein’s desk since the appearance approximately three weeks earlier at which plaintiff tendered hard-copy receipts and had been the subject of high-definition move-out photographs transmitted by email in the same intervening period. Cal. Penal Code §519 defines qualifying threats including the threat to do an unlawful injury to property, person, or rights; threatening to proceed with an eviction filing the threatener has documentary notice is not supported, to extract a payment, sits within §519. Source: Declaration of Michael Gasio (Code Civ. Proc. §2015.5), executed April 29, 2026 — declarant’s contemporaneous account, pending verbatim transcript verification.

On the first trial day, after approximately forty-five minutes of plaintiff’s evidentiary presentation — during which plaintiff displayed the receipt evidencing payment to BHHS through Hanson Le and during which Silverstein had called no witnesses and presented no documentary rebuttal — Silverstein addressed the bench, out of order, and conveyed, in substance, that in order to make it easier for the defendant, plaintiff would not pursue the damages. The mid-trial withdrawal of an entire damages claim, made by counsel of 47 years’ eviction-practice experience after the predicate exhibits had entered evidence and before any cross-examination, is a litigation event of evidentiary significance. CCP §128.7 conditions the filing of damages allegations on a representation that they have evidentiary support. The voluntary withdrawal of those allegations mid-trial, without further explanation on the record, is consistent with the inference that the evidentiary support did not exist. Source: Declaration of Michael Gasio (Code Civ. Proc. §2015.5), executed April 29, 2026 — declarant’s contemporaneous account, pending verbatim transcript verification.

When plaintiff stated to the court, in substance, that there was no standing and no debt between the parties — the matter being between Berkshire and paid — and displayed the receipt evidencing payment to Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices through Hanson Le, the property manager designated under the management contract, Silverstein responded orally, in substance, that a debt did exist. Silverstein produced no document, ledger, or contract supporting the oral assertion that a debt existed between Mr. Tran and plaintiff. The management contract identifying BHHS as the payment obligee was in the case file. The receipt evidencing payment had just been displayed in court. 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of a debt; subsection (10) prohibits the use of false or deceptive means to collect a debt. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), confirms FDCPA application to attorneys collecting on consumer debts. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal. Source: Declaration of Michael Gasio (Code Civ. Proc. §2015.5), executed April 29, 2026 — declarant’s contemporaneous account, pending verbatim transcript verification.

Hard-copy receipts evidencing payment to Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices were tendered to Silverstein in court at a prior appearance and were received by him into his folder. The high-definition move-out photographs depicting the condition of 19235 Brynn Court, Huntington Beach, at move-out and showing no damage were transmitted to Silverstein by email in the period preceding the first trial date. Approximately three weeks elapsed between the prior appearance at which the receipts were tendered and the first trial date. Cal. R. Prof. Conduct 1.0.1(f) defines “knows” as actual knowledge, which may be inferred from circumstances. The combination of (a) receipts physically tendered in court, (b) photographs transmitted by email, and (c) approximately three weeks’ intervening time supplies the knowledge element supporting the in-court conduct charged in S-19 through S-21. Source: Declaration of Michael Gasio (Code Civ. Proc. §2015.5), executed April 29, 2026 — declarant’s contemporaneous account, pending verbatim transcript verification.